Retrospective voting circumvents many of voters" cognitive limitations, but if voters" attributional judgments are systematically biased, retrospective voting becomes an independent source of political failure. We design and administer a new survey of the general public and political experts to test for such biases. Our analysis reveals frequent, large, robust biases, with an overarching tendency for the public to overestimate politicians" ability to influence outcomes. Retrospective voting usually gives elected leaders supraoptimal incentives, though there are important cases where the reverse holds.
Introduction
Voters are not merely ignorant; their beliefs about policy-relevant subjects are often systematically biased. Voters systematically overestimate the fraction of the federal budget spent on foreign aid and welfare, and underestimate the fraction spent on Social Security and health. (Kaiser Family Foundation and Harvard University 1995) Lessinformed voters favor systematically different policies than otherwise identical moreinformed voters. (Althaus 2003 (Althaus , 1998 (Althaus , 1996 Laymen"s beliefs about economics, the causes of cancer, and toxicology systematically diverge from the beliefs of experts, even when matched on traits like income, employment sector, job security, demographics, party identification, and ideology. (Caplan and Miller 2010; Caplan 2007 Caplan , 2002 Lichter and Rothman 1999; Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic 1992) Voters also tend to discount evidence in conflict with their pre-existing beliefs. (Taber and Lodge 2006; Bullock 2006; Nyhan and Reifler 2010) Taken together, the evidence raises a troubling question:
If politicians cater to the policy preferences of the median voter, won"t inefficient and counter-productive policies win by popular demand?
The strongest reply to this concern is that citizens vote for results, not policies. As the retrospective voting literature argues, politicians win popularity by delivering prosperity, peace, safe streets, and well-educated students -not by pandering to the public"s beliefs about the best means to achieve these ends. (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Sanders 2000 ; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Lupia 1994; Peltzman 1990; Ferejohn 1986; Kiewiet and Rivers 1984; Fiorina 1981; Barro 1973; Key 1967) One simple heuristic -reward success, punish failure -seems to allow voters with little, zero, or even negative knowledge about policy to extract socially desirable behavior from their leaders.
Unfortunately for democracy, this heuristic is not as foolproof as it seems. In order to reward success and punish failure, voters need to know which government actors -if any -are able to influence the various outcomes voters care about. (Arceneaux 2006; Anderson 2006; Cutler 2008 Cutler , 2004 Rudolph and Grant 2002; Somin 1998 ; Lewis-Beck 1997; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Kerr 1975 ) As Achen and Bartels (2004a: 6) 
put it:
If jobs have been lost in a recession, something is wrong, but is that the president"s fault? If it is not, then voting on the basis of economic results may be no more rational than killing the pharaoh when the Nile does not flood...
Of course, well-functioning democracy does not require "whodunnit" knowledge to be universal. If well-informed voters know the right people to reward and punish, and the rest of the electorate votes randomly, politicians still have clear incentives to deliver good results. (Surowiecki 2004; Wittman 1995; Page and Shapiro 1993, 1992; Converse 1990) The real danger to democracy comes from systematically biased beliefs about political influence. (Caplan 2007; Rabin 1998; Thaler 1992; Gilovich 1991) Just as the market for automobile repair will work poorly if the average customer blames his grocer for engine trouble, local elections will work poorly if the average voter blames the president for the quality of public schools.
To test the American public"s beliefs about political influence for systematic bias, we designed a new survey, and administered it to two distinct groups: (1) a nationally representative sample of Americans, and (2) members of the American Political Science Association who specialize in American politics. One of the main ways that scholars have tested for the presence of systematic bias on other topics is to see whether average beliefs of laymen and experts diverge. (Caplan 2007; Lichter and Rothman 1999; Kraus, Malmfors, and Slovic 1992) As Kahneman and Tversky describe their method: "The presence of an error of judgment is demonstrated by comparing people's responses either with an established fact... or with an accepted rule of arithmetic, logic, or statistics." (Kahneman and Tversky 1982: 493) "Established" or "accepted" by whom? By experts, of course. We extend this approach to questions of political influence. If laymen and experts" average beliefs differ, our defeasible presumption is that experts are right and laymen are wrong.
Systematically biased attributional beliefs turn out to be common and large. Fully 14 out of 16 survey questions exhibit statistically significant biases. Compared to experts in American politics, the public greatly overestimates the influence of state and local governments on the economy, the president and Congress on the quality of public education, the Federal Reserve on the budget, Congress on the Iraq War, and the Supreme Court on crime rates. The public also moderately underestimates the influence of the Federal Reserve on the economy, state and local governments on public education, and the president and Congress on the budget. While we are open to the possibility that non-cognitive factors explain observed belief gaps, controlling for demographics and various measures of self-serving and ideological bias does little to alter our results. A full set of controls reduces the absolute magnitude of the raw belief gaps by less than 13% -and leaves the number of statistically significant lay-expert differences unchanged.
Earlier researchers have already identified some systematic biases that undermine retrospective voting. Voters myopically reward and punish politicians for recent economic performance. (Bartels 2010; Bartels 2008, 2004a ) Partisanship heavily distorts voters" attributional judgments. (Marsh and Tilley 2009; Rudolph 2006 Rudolph , 2003a Rudolph , 2003b Bartels 2002 ) Supporters of incumbent parties are eager to credit the government for good outcomes and reluctant to blame it for bad outcomes, opponents of incumbent parties do the opposite -and both sides can"t be right. Voters also reward and punish politicians for outcomes that are clearly irrelevant or beyond their control, such as local football victories, world oil prices, and the state of the world economy. (Wolfers 2011; Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010; Leigh 2009; Bartels 2004b) Arceneaux and Stein (2006) report that many voters incorrectly blamed the incumbent mayor of the city of Houston for the county government"s flood policy. Iyengar (1989: 878) finds important framing effects: "agents of causal responsibility are viewed negatively while agents of treatment responsibility are viewed positively." Healy and Malhotra (2009) show that voters reward politicians for disaster relief spending, but not disaster prevention spending, even though prevention is demonstrably more cost-effective. Marsh and Tilley (2009), Tilley, Garry, and Bold (2008) , Arceneaux and Stein (2006), Rudolph (2003a) , and Gomez and Wilson (2001) Partin, 1998, 1995) Our results do not imply, of course, that the American public"s beliefs about political influence are biased in every conceivable respect. Voters" attributional judgments often respond in rational ways to divided government (Rudolph 2003a; Whitten and Palmer 1999; Lewis-Beck 1997; Leyden and Borrelli 1995; Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Powell and Whitten 1993) and federalism (Arceneaux 2006 , Anderson 2006 , Cutler 2004 Stein 1990 ). Nevertheless, the American public"s beliefs about political influence are biased in some important respects, raising serious questions about the ability of retrospective voting to circumvent other slippages in the democratic process.
The next section describes the Perceptions of Political Influence on Policy Outcomes Survey. Section 3 presents our benchmark results. Section 4 adds controls to address the possibility of expert bias. Section 5 discusses the broader significance of our results.
Section 6 concludes.
Data
We administered our Perceptions of Political Influence on Policy Outcomes Survey in two distinct phases -one for laymen, the other for experts. In phase one, conducted on Note that lower numbers indicate more perceived influence. Table 2 lists both groups" mean responses to Zogby"s demographic and control questions. As expected, political scientists are markedly more educated, affluent, male, Democratic, and liberal than the general public.
Benchmark Results
In standard rational choice models of belief formation, additional information reduces the variance of beliefs without changing their mean. (Sheffrin 1996; Lucas 1973; Muth 1961) One implication is that laymen and experts will have the same average beliefs. As long as experts are correct on average, we can test the public"s political influence beliefs for systematic bias simply by checking whether American politics specialists in the APSA systematically disagree. (Caplan 2007) In principle, admittedly, belief gaps could indicate bias in either group -or both. But almost everyone concedes a general presumption in favor of expert consensus. The APSA members in our sample have typically studied American politics for decades. 80%
of our political scientists -versus just 32% of the public -earned perfect scores on a four-question objective political knowledge test included in our survey. If American politics specialists systematically disagree with novices, the novices" defenders have to provide some reason to undermine the experts" credibility.
Before we can consider the main challenges to political scientists" credibility, though, we must estimate some benchmark results. We use ordered logits to measure the lay-expert belief gap for all of the beliefs in Table 1 . Table 3 displays the estimated coefficients and z-stats when our Political Scientist dummy is the sole independent variable.
The initial case for systematic bias is strong. Differences between political scientists and the general public are statistically significant in 15 out of 16 questions; the one exception was the president"s influence on the war in Iraq. The absolute value of the z-stat>4 in 14 out of 16 questions. These beliefs gaps are also fairly large in substantive terms. The average absolute value of the lay-expert gap is .36 on our 4-point scale.
The most obvious difference between political scientists and the public: The public thinks that politicians have more influence over outcomes. 11 out of the 15 statistically significant belief gaps are positive, indicating that political scientists ascribe less influence to politicians than the public does. The public thinks that all of the actors mentioned in our survey -the president, Congress, the Supreme Court, and state and local governments -have more influence over crime rates than political scientists will admit.
Still, the pattern is more complex than "political scientists see more randomness in politics than the public" or "the public scapegoats leaders for outcomes beyond their 
Expert Bias?
Large, systematic disagreements between laymen and political experts provide prima facie evidence of systematic public bias. But the prima facie case can be rebutted.
Political scientists sharply differ from the broader public on several non-cognitive dimensions. They are disproportionately affluent white males. Since humans often suffer from self-serving bias (Dahl and Ransom 1999; Babcock and Loewenstein 1997) , Fortunately, our data set is rich enough to test both of these doubts about the experts" credibility. Suppose political scientists" distinctive views stem entirely from self-serving bias. Then controlling for income, sex, race, and other measures of self-interest should drive the coefficients on the political science dummy variable to zero. Similarly, if political scientists" distinctive views stem entirely from their liberalism, then the estimated effect of training in political science should vanish after controlling for party identification and ideology.
Self-serving bias. We re-estimate all of the ordered logits in Table 3 with controls for race (with white as the reference category), gender, age, age squared, income, job security, and expected income growth. Table 4 shows (a) the revised coefficients on the Political Scientist dummy, (b) the revised z-stats, and (c) the expected beliefs of laymen and experts after setting all of the control variables equal to their median values for the lay respondents.
The results offer virtually no support to the self-serving bias hypothesis. Indeed, after adding all of these controls, the PoliSci variable becomes statistically significant in all 16
equations. The z-stat exceeds 4 in all but three cases. The average magnitude of the predicted belief gaps is .35, compared to .36 in the raw data. While political scientists are indeed economically and demographically unusual, these potentially self-serving differences have no apparent effect on their attributional beliefs.
Ideological bias. There are persuasive reasons to suspect that at least part of political scientists" disagreements with the broader public stems from ideological bias. Political scientists are decidedly more Democratic and liberal than the broader population. Earlier research suggests that these political variables will sway political scientists beliefs in two ways.
First, since our survey was run during the final troubled year of the Bush administration, with both houses of Congress under Democratic control, the evidence on partisan bias suggests that political scientists would exaggerate the influence of the president relative to other branches of government. (Marsh and Tilley 2009; Rudolph 2006 Rudolph , 2003a Rudolph , 2003b Bartels 2002) Second, as Rudolph (2003b: 701-2) predicts and broadly confirms, liberals tend to give government actors more credit and blame for economic outcomes: "Just as the "ethic of self-reliance" prevents many people from blaming government for their personal economic problems... so too may economic conservatism prevent certain people from attributing responsibility for the national economy to government officials." Liberals" belief in governments" centrality arguably generalizes to non-economic outcome variables as well. Conservatives might hold, for example, that good schools and safe streets depend primarily on family values rather than government policy.
To test the ideological bias hypothesis, we re-estimate all of the ordered logits in Table 3 with controls for party and ideology. Since Zogby"s party questions include an "other party" option, and its ideology question includes a "libertarian" option, we add dummy variables for "other party" and "libertarian." Table 5 shows ( what extent do laymen with graduate educations "think like political scientists"? To answer this question, we re-estimate all of the ordered logits in Table 3 with controls for self-serving bias, ideological bias, and educational attainment. Table 6 shows ( political scientists and the public therefore reflects roughly 90% training in political science, and just 10% education per se.
Discussion: The Effects of Bias

A. Theory
Retrospective voting is the last, best safety net for democratic efficiency. The defender of democracy can stipulate to all of the electorate"s alleged inadequacies. He can accept the empirical evidence of the typical voter"s ignorance (Somin forthcoming, 1998; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Bennett 1996; Converse 1964) and irrationality (Wolfers 2011; Healy, Malhotra, and Mo 2010; Healy and Malhotra 2009; Caplan 2007) . As long as these ignorant and irrational voters know enough to reward success and punish failure, democracy can still work well. Public-minded politicians would still make some effort to produce good results (Besley 2007) , but this would be a charitable donation rather than a self-interested response to electoral incentives.
Case 2: Overestimating influence. The dangers of overestimating politicians" influence on outcomes are less obvious, but no less real. Retrospective voters who overestimate political actors" influence over outcomes will be too eager to vote against incumbents when conditions are bad, and too willing to vote for incumbents when conditions are good.
It is tempting to object that the stronger politicians" incentives are, the better. But this is simply untrue: In a noisy world, incentives can easily be too strong. Gibbons (2005) , Baker (2002 Baker ( , 1992 , Zenger and Marshall (2000) , Sappington (1991) , Weitzman (1980), and Kerr (1975) analyze a wide range of mechanisms, most of which hinge on agents" risk-aversion. But when the key incentive is not compensation, but continuation or termination of employment, high stakes may be unwise even with risk-neutral agents.
Imagine a company that fires its CEO at the end of any day its stock price goes down.
While the CEO would have a strong incentive to succeed, there are major downsides.
The firm would inevitably fire many qualified, diligent CEOs. To attract candidates for such an insecure position, the firm would have to boost compensation, settle for lowerquality leadership, or incur extremely high search costs. Moreover, the CEO might have strong perverse incentives to sacrifice the long-term interests of stockholders in order to boost short-term stock prices. Perhaps most importantly, firing CEOs after their first losing day would entail frequent disruptive interregnums.
Giving politicians supraoptimal incentives leads to analogous pathologies. Suppose voters overestimate the effect of the nation"s president on the quality of public schools, and vote accordingly: If the public schools don"t measure up, they fire the incumbent in the next election. This admittedly amplifies presidents" incentive to improve public schools. But if the president has little influence in this area, voters will frequently fire high-quality executives who did well given their constraints. As a result, voters will have to boost politicians" pay, settle for inferior candidates, or incur additional search costs.
Overestimation of the incumbent"s influence in one policy area also leads voters to overvalue outcomes in the field relative to other issues. If the public overestimates the president"s influence on education outcomes, they might focus too much on that issue when deciding whether to re-elect him, and not enough on other matters over which he has more control, such federal judicial appointments. Thus, an incumbent with a good record on issues where he has a lot of influence could be voted out because of poor results in areas where his decisions have little real impact. The greatest drawback of overestimation of political influence, though, may simply be needless disruption every time the polity replaces one scapegoat with another.
Overestimation is particularly dangerous when there is a cap on the penalty for failure. In most democracies, for example, the executive"s worst-case scenario is simply to be voted out of office. As a result, an incumbent with slightly sub par performance has a clear incentive to take big risks to make the cut: Heads he wins, tails he suffers the same fate he would have met if he played it safe. (Calomiris 1999; Rose-Ackerman 1991) . In the extreme case, politicians fearing electoral defeat might instigate "diversionary" wars or other foreign crises in the hopes of strengthening their standing. (Smith 1996) If the war or crisis results in success, the imperilled leader might stave off electoral defeat. If it ends in defeat, the leader is not much worse off than before, since he was likely to lose power anyway. 
B. Empirics
Our data suggest that all three cases are empirically relevant. But Case 2 -overestimation -predominates. In our data, voters exaggerate politicians" influence, so retrospective voters typically overreward politicians for success and overpunish them for failure. This does not mean that reelection rates are too low. The implication, rather, is that reelection rates are too high when outcomes are good, and too low when outcomes are bad. If this conclusion seems implausible, perhaps the reason is that the very idea of "supraoptimal incentives" is so counterintuitive. The first measures the prevalence of retrospective versus prospective voting: "When deciding which candidate to vote for, does the candidate"s past performance or the candidate"s promise for the future matter more to you?" The second measures the popularity of character versus policy voting: "When deciding which candidate to vote for, does the candidate"s character and values, or the candidate"s position on policy issues matter more to you?" For both questions, "Both matter equally to me" was a third response option. Table 7 breaks down the results for political scientists and the public.
Responses to the first question confirm that retrospective voting is widespread, but far from universal. Over half of the public said "past performance," and another third said for outcomes, good economics may well be bad politics.
Conclusion
Voter competence in assessing blame can only be measured against a suitable benchmark. Earlier benchmarks include myopia, sensitivity to exogenous events (e.g.
world oil prices, natural disasters, or the state of the world economy), and systematic effects of party, education, and political sophistication. We extend this literature by using expert consensus as a benchmark. We administer identical questions to both a nationally representative American sample and American politics specialists from the American Political Science Association. When laymen and experts hold systematically different beliefs about political influence, we treat this as prima face evidence of voter bias.
The prima facie evidence of voter bias is strong. Political scientists and the public systematically disagree on 15 out of 16 questions. Their belief gaps are usually large in magnitude and highly statistically significant. We then explore the robustness of these findings by controlling for important non-cognitive differences between political scientists and the public. Political scientists are much more affluent, liberal, Democratic, and male than the general population. It turns out, however, that none of these differences explain more than a small fraction of the lay-expert gap. Even after we add education to the list of control variables, over 90% of the raw belief gap between political scientists and the public remains.
These findings shed light on two broader topics. First, they undermine the view that systematically biased beliefs about policy can be safely ignored. Retrospective voting may partially mitigate the effect of popular misconceptions about economics, toxicology, and other subjects. But retrospective voting is a flawed filter. Second, our findings show that retrospective voting actually adds new contaminants to the democratic process.
Systematically biased beliefs about political influence make some politicians" incentives overly weak, and others" excessively strong.
The most obvious direction for future research is to explore the robustness of our findings using other samples and other benchmarks of voter competence. But perhaps more importantly, our research highlights the need for new formal political models that incorporate realistic assumptions about human cognition (e.g. Caplan 2003; Kuran and Sunstein 1999) If the president knows that voters will partially blame Congress for his errors, how does this change his behavior? If Congressmen expect to be the president"s scapegoats, how will they respond? Can both branches profit by creating an unelected agency to deflect the blame for bad outcomes? The best response to unrealistic formal models is not to abandon models, but to rebuild them on empirically sound assumptions. 1= "very influential" 2= "somewhat influential" 3= "not very influential" 4= "not at all influential" In politics today, do you consider yourself a...?
Which major party do you usually lean toward?
-2= "Democrat" -1= "Independent, Lean Democrat" 0= "Independent" 1= "Independent, Lean Republican" 2= "Republican"
.04 -1.11
Other .01 .04
Which description best represents your political ideology? 1 = "Progressive/very liberal" 2= "liberal" 3= "moderate" 4=
"conservative" 5= "very conservative" 1= "Less than $25,000" 2= "$25,000-$34,999" 3= "$35,000-$49,999" 4= "$50,000-$74,999" 5= "$75,000-$99,999" 6= "$100,000 or more" 3.63 5.15
Are you very concerned, somewhat concerned, not too concerned, or not at all concerned about yourself or someone else in your household losing their job within the next year?
1= "Very concerned" 2= "Somewhat concerned" 3= "Not too concerned" 4= "Not at all concerned" 2.64 3.02
Over the next five years, do you expect your family"s income to grow faster or slower than the cost of living, or do you think it will grow at the same pace?
1= "Grow slower than the cost of living" 2= "It will grow at the same pace" 3= "Grow faster than the cost of living" 2.27 2.07
Which of the following best describes your highest level of education?
1= "Less than high school graduate" 2= "High school graduate" 3= "Some college" 4= "College graduate" 5= "Graduate or professional school after college" 3.38 4.98
Political scientist 0.00 1.00 
